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Quantum physics allows for unconditionally secure communication through insecure communication chan-
nels. The achievable rates of quantum-secured communication are fundamentally limited by the laws of quantum
physics and in particular by the properties of entanglement. For a lossy communication line, this implies that
the secret-key generation rate vanishes at least exponentially with the communication distance. We show that
this fundamental limitation can be violated in a realistic scenario where the eavesdropper can store quantum
information for only a finite, yet arbitrarily long, time. We consider communication through a lossy bononic
channel (modeling linear loss in optical fibers) and we show that it is in principle possible to achieve a constant
rate of key generation of one bit per optical mode over arbitrarily long communication distances.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.-w, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises uncondi-
tional secure communication through insecure communica-
tion channels [1]. In real world implementations of QKD,
however, the achievable secret-key rates are still relatively low
compared with standard telecommunication rates. The rates
of secret-key generation are not only constrained by exper-
imental imperfections, which can be amended in principle,
but are also limited by the fundamental features of quantum
physics. As recently shown in [2], the entanglement between
the two ends of the communication channel ultimately bounds
the maximum rate of secret-key generation:
R ≤ Esq(N ) , (1)
where Esq(N ) is an entropic quantity called the squashed en-
tanglement of the channel [3], which is function of the quan-
tum communication channel N linking the legitimate sender
Alice to the legitimate receiver Bob.
In this paper we consider the case where the communication
channelN is a lossy (and noisy) bosonic channel. This means
that information is encoded in a collection of bosonic modes
whose corresponding canonical operators are denoted aj , a†j
and satisfy the commutation relations [aj′ , a†j ] = δjj′ . In
the Heisenberg picture the quantum channel maps the canon-
ical operators aj , a†j to aj →
√
η aj +
√
1− η vj , a†j →√
η a†j +
√
1− η v†j , where η ∈ [0, 1] is the attenuation factor
(also called transmissivity) and vj , v†j are the canonical ladder
operators of an environment bosonic mode. The lossy channel
is obtained if the environment mode is initially in the vacuum
state, while the lossy and noisy channel corresponds to the en-
vironment mode being in a thermal state with NT mean pho-
ton number. These channels attenuate the input power by a
factor η and model the ubiquitous processes of linear absorp-
tion and scattering of light.
When applied to the case of the lossy bosonic channel, the
squashed entanglement bound in (1) yields [2]:
R ≤ log
(
1 + η
1− η
)
, (2)
where the rate is measured in bits (throughout this paper
log ≡ log2) per bosonic mode (given the bandwidth of the
channel, this can be easily translated in bits per second). For
both free space and fiber optics communication, the attenua-
tion factor η = e−ℓ/ℓ0 scales exponentially with the distance
ℓ between sender and receiver, where the characteristic length
ℓ0 depends on experimental conditions. For long distances,
R ≤ 2 η = 2 e−ℓ/ℓ0 , and the key rate decays at least expo-
nentially with increasing communication distance. This result
marks a striking difference between quantum-secured com-
munication and (insecure) classical communication. In the
latter case, one can in principle achieve a finite communica-
tion rate over arbitrarily long distances, just by sufficiently
increasing the signal power [4]. Unfortunately, this is not
the case for quantum communication where a fundamental
rate-distance tradeoff exists, requiring the use of quantum re-
peaters to perform QKD on long distances.
It is thus clear that to go around the fundamental rate-
distance tradeoff in (2) one should renounce unconditionally
security. Here we discuss QKD conditioned on the assump-
tion that technological limitations allow an eavesdropper Eve
to store quantum information reliably only for a known and
finite – but otherwise arbitrarily long – time. Such an eaves-
dropper may also have unlimited computational power, in-
cluding a quantum computer. Indeed, any physical realization
of a quantum memory can reliably store quantum information
only for a time of the order of its coherence time. We stress
that we do not require the legitimate receiver to have better
quantum storage technologies than the eavesdropper. As will
be shown, the legitimate parties could have a much shorter
memory time than the eavesdropper and the communication
will still be secure.
II. SECURITY DEFINITIONS
According to the state of the art, one requires a quantum
cryptography protocol to be unconditionally and composably
secure. Unconditional security means that one does not rely
on unproven statements (e.g, about the complexity of factor-
izing large numbers, or in general about the computational
power of the eavesdropper). Composable security means that
2the given protocol is secure also when used as a subroutine
within an overarching protocol [5].
Suppose that a given communication protocol aims at es-
tablishing a secret message described as a random variable
X . The information about X in the hands of the eavesdrop-
per Eve is described, without loss of generality, by a bipartite
quantum state of the form
ρXE =
∑
x
pX(x) |x〉〈x| ⊗ ρE(x) . (3)
Ideally, one would like Eve’s state to be completely uncorre-
lated with the message X , that is, ρXE = ρX ⊗ ρE [6]. To
quantify the deviation from such an ideal setting one considers
the trace distance [7]
D(ρXE , ρX ⊗ ρE) := 1
2
‖ρXE − ρX ⊗ ρE‖1 . (4)
Therefore, the security of the communication protocol is as-
sessed by the condition
D(ρXE , ρX ⊗ ρE) ≤ ǫ , (5)
which implies that the state ρXE is indistinguishable, up to a
probability smaller than ǫ, from the state ρX ⊗ ρE , that is, the
given communication protocol is secure up to a probability
smaller than ǫ [8]. As a matter of fact this criterion guarantees
unconditional and composable security [8].
In this paper we renounce unconditional security and seek
security conditioned on the fact that the eavesdropper can
store quantum information only for a finite and known time τ .
This means that Eve is forced to make a measurement within
a time τ after obtaining the quantum state. Suppose that Eve
has made a measurement Λ described by the POVM (positive
operator valued measurement) elements {Λy}y [9]. After the
measurement has been made, the state has ‘collapsed’ to
ρ′XE =
∑
y
TrE(ρXE I⊗ Λy) |y〉E〈y| (6)
=
∑
x,y
pX(x)Tr (ρE(x) Λy) |x〉〈x| ⊗ |y〉E〈y| . (7)
Since ρ′XE is diagonal in the basis {|x〉 ⊗ |y〉}, we have
D(ρ′XE , ρ
′
X ⊗ ρ′E) =
∑
x,y
|pXY (x, y)− pX(x)pY (y)| (8)
=: D(pXY , pXpY ) , (9)
where pXY (x, y) = pX(x)pY |x(y) with pY |x(y) =
Tr (ρE(x) Λy) and pY (y) =
∑
x pX(x)pY |x(y), that is, the
trace distance equals the distance between classical probabil-
ities. Finally, optimizing over Eve’s choice of her measure-
ment, we obtain the following security condition:
sup
Λ
D(pXY , pXpY ) ≤ ǫ . (10)
In this paper, instead of working directly with condition
(10), we require
Iacc(X ;E)ρ ≤ ǫ′ , (11)
where Iacc(X ;E)ρ denotes the accessible information of Eve
aboutX given the state ρXE [10]. The latter implies condition
(10), for ǫ =
√
2 ln (2) ǫ′, via Pinsker inequality [11]
max
Λ
D(pXY , pXpY ) ≤
√
2 ln (2) Iacc(X ;E)ρ . (12)
It is worth recalling that accessible information was used as
a security quantifier during the first years of quantum cryptog-
raphy, since it was found that a security criterion based on the
accessible information does not in general guarantee compos-
able security in an unconditional manner [8]. Here instead we
have shown that composability holds under condition (10) if
we give up full unconditional security and seek security un-
der the assumption that the eavesdropper can store quantum
information only for a finite and known time — i.e, she has a
quantum memory with limited storage time.
III. SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
We present two novel key-generation protocols for
continuous-variable quantum optical communication through
a lossy bosonic channel with transmissivity η, modeling linear
attenuation and scattering. These protocols are composably
secure under the condition that Eve’s as a quantum memory
with finite, and known, but otherwise arbitrarily long, storage
time.
The first protocol is a direct-reconciliation protocol (in
which we allow information reconciliation by forward pub-
lic communication from the sender Alice to the receiver Bob).
We obtain a simple formula for the asymptotic key rate (see
Fig. 1):
rdr = 1 + log
(
η
1− η
)
. (13)
This protocol can generate a nonzero key rate for any η > 1/3.
By comparison, the maximum unconditionally secure key rate
from direct reconciliation is given by the quantum capacity
formula log
(
η
1−η
)
[12] and is positive only for η > 1/2 [13].
The second protocol is a reverse-reconciliation protocol
(we allow information reconciliation by backward public
communication from Bob to Alice). In this setting we show
that Alice and Bob can in principle generate key at an asymp-
totic rate of more than 1 bit per bosonic mode sent through
the channel. This is true for any nonzero value of the trans-
missivity η, provided sufficient input energy is provided —
hence reproducing the feature of insecure classical communi-
cation in a quantum-secured communication framework. The
achievable asymptotic key rate is (see Fig. 2)
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1− η
)
. (14)
By comparison, the maximum fully unconditional key rate is
upper bounded by the expression in (2) and vanishes as 2η for
small values of η.
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FIG. 1: Achievable key rate for the pure loss channel (NT = 0) vs
the channel transmissivity η, in bits per mode, for direct reconcilia-
tion protocols. Blue solid line: Achievable locked-key rate as given
by the expression in (13). Red dashed line: Maximum fully uncondi-
tional secret-key rate, given by the expression max{0, log
(
η
1−η
)
}
[12].
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FIG. 2: Achievable key rate for the pure loss channel (NT = 0) vs
the channel transmissivity η, in bits per mode, for reverse reconcili-
ation protocols. Blue solid line: Achievable locked-key rate as from
the expression in (14). Red dashed line: Upper bound for the secret-
key rate (assisted by two-way public communication), given by the
expression in (2). Yellow dash-dotted line: Achievable asymptotic
secret-key rate according to the standard security definition as given
by the reverse coherence information log
(
1
1−η
)
[14].
We also consider the case of lossy and noisy bosonic chan-
nel, which models the presence of experimental imperfec-
tion or a thermal-like background with NT mean photons per
mode. The lossy and noisy channel is also used to model an
‘active attack’ from the eavesdropper, who injects noise in the
channel. In this case we obtain an asymptotic rate equal to
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1− η
)
− g(NT ) , (15)
which is nonzero at arbitrary distances provided NT . 0.3
(see Fig. 3)
These protocols are instances of quantum data locking pro-
tocols (see Sec. V). We henceforth call locked key a key which
is generated by a quantum data locking protocol, just to re-
mind us that this key is not unconditionally secure, but secure
conditioned on the assumption of finite memory storage time.
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FIG. 3: Tolerable excess noise NT vs the transmissivity η for the
reverse-reconciliation quantum data locking protocol, from Eq. (15).
The asymptotic locked-key generation rate is nonzero for values of
(η,NT ) below the curve.
IV. COMPARISON WITH OTHER MODELS
It is known that high rates of secret-key generation can be
attained against an eavesdropper endowed with an imperfect
quantum memory, as for example in the Bounded Storage
Model, where Eve can store only a constrained number of
qubits (see e.g. [15]). Even under bounded storage, no known
protocol attains a constant rate as a function of distance. Else-
where we have shown that quantum data locking allows for
a substantial enhancement of the key rate [16, 17]. Here we
show for the first time that such an assumption allows us to
generate key at a constant rate across virtually any distance. It
is an open question whether the quantum data locking could
be applied in the bounded storage model to attain rates of key
generation independent on the distance.
Our results must be compared with the bounds on the opti-
mal secret-key rate obtained requiring fully unconditional se-
curity. In the asymptotic setting, the security is usually quan-
tified by the quantum mutual information (see e.g. [18]). The
gain in key generation rate that we achieve follows from the
existence of a large gap between the quantum mutual infor-
mation and the accessible information of the adversary. This
gap is well known in quantum information theory: it is the
quantum discord [19], which quantifies the quantum correla-
tions that the adversary cannot access by local measurements
on her share of the quantum system.
V. QUANTUM DATA LOCKING AND QUANTUM ENIGMA
MACHINES
In a typical quantum data locking protocol [20–23], the two
legitimate parties, say Alice and Bob, publicly agree on a set
of MK quantum codewords. They then use a preshared se-
cret key of logK bits, labeled by s = 1, 2, . . . ,K , to secretly
agree on a set of M (equally probable) codewords, labeled by
x = 1, 2, . . . ,M , used to encode logM bits of classical infor-
mation. These quantum codewords are sent through n uses of
a quantum channel from Alice to Bob. Suppose an eavesdrop-
per Eve tampers with the communication line and obtains one
4of the states ρnE(x, s). The correlations between Eve’s quan-
tum system and the input message x are described by the state
ρnXE =
1
M
M∑
x=1
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1
K
K∑
s=1
ρnE(x, s) , (16)
where {|x〉}x=1,...,M is an orthonormal basis for an auxiliary
quantum system encoding the messages x — notice that the
summation over s comes from the fact that Eve does not know
the value of the secret key. One can prove that, if the states
ρnE(x, s) have a suitable form and forK large enough, Eve can
only obtain a negligible amount of the classical information —
as quantified by the accessible information — carried by the
label x.
In the most powerful quantum data locking schemes known
up to now, a constant-size preshared secret seed of about
logK = log 1/ǫ bits allows Alice and Bob to encrypt logM
bits (with M arbitrarily large), with the guarantee that Eve’s
accessible information is of the order of ǫ logM bits [24–26].
It is worth remarking that quantum data locking provides
a strongest violations of classical information theory in the
quantum setting. Indeed, according to a famous theorem of
Shannon’s, which assesses the security of one-time pad en-
cryption, to encrypt m bits of classical information Alice and
Bob need at least m bits of preshared secret key [27]. Quan-
tum data locking violates this Shannon’s result by an expo-
nential amount.
A quantum data locking protocol can be seen as a quantum
counterpart of the twentieth century Enigma machine [28].
Following [28, 29] we call ‘quantum enigma machine’ an op-
tical cipher that harnesses the quantum data locking effect.
A. Quantum bootstrapping
The first works on quantum data locking only considered
the ideal case of a noiseless communication scenario. Only
recently the quantum data locking effect has been considered
in a noisy setting [28–30] (see also [31]). Here we combine
quantum data locking with a key-recycling technique that has
been successfully applied to quantum data locking in a noisy
communication scenario [16, 20, 32].
We assume that eavesdropper Eve and the legitimate re-
ceiver can store quantum information for a time τE and τB ,
respectively.
Suppose then that Alice and Bob, using the quantum chan-
nel n times, run a quantum data locking protocol to commu-
nicate logM = nχ bits of classical information, and con-
sume logK = nk bits of preshared secret key. Bob may
need to perform a collective measurement over n quantum
systems in order to decode. Since, as from our assumption,
Bob’s quantum memory can store quantum information only
for times shorter than τB , this requires that the n quantum
signals should be sent within this time interval (this is always
possible for τB large enough or by increasing the repetition
rate).
On the other hand, if Eve has a quantum memory with fi-
nite coherence time τE , this implies that she is forced to mea-
sure within a time τE after receiving the signals, otherwise
her memory will decohere anyway. Therefore, what the legit-
imate parties Alice and Bob can do is to wait for a time longer
than τE before sending more information through the channel.
After waiting such a time, Alice and Bob can safely recycle
part of the obtained key as a fresh key to run another round of
quantum data locking.
Thus, for χ > k, Alice and Bob can recycle part of the
newly established key and use it as a seed for another round
of quantum data locking. By repeating this procedure many
times they will asymptotically obtain a overall locked-key rate
of r = χ − k bits per channel use, with a negligible amount
of initially shared secret key.
While r = χ − k is the rate of bits per channel use, one
could expect a lower rate in terms of bits per second, due
to the waiting times between quantum data locking subrou-
tines. There is a simple strategy to solve this problem: Alice
and Bob can use the dead times to run two (or more) inde-
pendent quantum data locking protocols. In this way they
can in principle achieve a rate of bits per second as high as
rν = (χ − k)ν, where ν is the number of channel uses per
second. Notice that this holds for any value of τE , as long as
it is known to Alice and Bob, and independently of τB (for
instance we can take τB = τE or even τB < τE).
VI. THE DIRECT RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
Alice prepares multimode coherent states that encode both
the input message x ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and the value of the secret
seeds s ∈ {1, . . . ,K} she shares with Bob. The encoding is
by a random code (whose codebook is public) that assigns to
each pair (x, s) an n-mode coherent states
|αn(x, s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|αj(x, s)〉 , (17)
where αj(x, s) is the amplitude of the coherent state of
the j-th bosonic mode sent through the channel. This is
schematically depicted in Fig. 4, where the lossty channel
is represented as a beam-plitter. To construct the random
code, the amplitudes of the coherent states are independently
drawn from a circularly symmetric Gaussian distribution, de-
noted G(0,N), with zero mean and mean photon number∫
d2α |α|2G(0,N) = N .
The receiver Bob obtains the attenuated coherent states
|√η αn(x, s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|√η αj(x, s)〉 . (18)
The goal of Bob, who knows the value of s, is to decode x. It
is known that he can do that (with asymptotically negligible
error) with an asymptotic bit-rate for x given by [4]
χdr := lim
n→∞
logM
n
= g(ηN) , (19)
where
g(N) = (N + 1) log (N + 1)−N logN . (20)
5FIG. 4: The lossy bosonic channel can be modeled as a beam-splitter
with transmissivity η and the environment mode initially in the vac-
uum state. In the direct reconciliation protocol, Alice sends coherent
state down the channel.
To guarantee the security of the communication protocol,
we have to bound Eve’s accessible information. For any x
and s, Eve obtains the attenuated coherent states
|
√
1− η αn(x, s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|
√
1− η αj(x, s)〉 . (21)
We can show (see Sec. VIII) that Eve’s accessible information
about Alice’s input message x is negligibly small, provided
Alice and Bob initially share enough bits of secret key. For N
large enough, and asymptotically in n, this is achieved for
kdr := lim
n→∞
logK
n
= 2g[(1− η)N ]− g[2(1− η)N ] . (22)
Applying the key-bootstrapping routine (see Sec. V A), this
yields a net asymptotic locked-key generation rate of
rdr = χdr − kdr = g(ηN)− 2g[(1− η)N ] + g[2(1− η)N ] ,
(23)
which in the limit of N →∞ becomes
rdr = 1 + log
(
η
1− η
)
. (24)
VII. THE REVERSE RECONCILIATION PROTOCOL
In the first phase of the protocol Alice prepares n instances
of a two-mode squeezed vacuum state, with N mean photons
per mode, that is, ρnAA′ = ρ
⊗n
AA′ with
ρAA′ = |ζN 〉AA′〈ζN | (25)
and
|ζN 〉AA′ = 1√
N + 1
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
N
N + 1
)ℓ/2
|ℓ〉A|ℓ〉A′ , (26)
where |ℓ〉 denotes the photon-number state with ℓ photons. Al-
ice keeps the modes labeled with ‘A’ and sends throughn uses
of a lossy bosonic channel those labeled with ‘A′’, see Fig. 5.
At the end of this first phase of the communication protocol,
Alice, Bob and Eve share the 3n-mode state ρnABE = ρ
⊗n
ABE ,
where ρABE is a 3-mode Gaussian state with zero mean and
covariance matrix VABE (whose explicit form is given in the
Appendix).
In the second phase of the communication protocol, Bob
makes a collective measurement on his share of n bosonic
modes, described by the state ρnB = ρ
⊗n
B , where ρB is a Gaus-
sian state with zero mean and variance VB (see Appendix
for details). Indeed, Bob applies a measurement Γ(s) cho-
sen from a set of measurements parameterized by the label
s = 1, . . . ,K . The value of s is determined by the secret
key he shares with Alice. That is, while the list of possible K
measurement is public and hence known to Eve, the specific
choice of Γ(s) is known only by Alice and Bob.
Bob’s measurement is defined as follows. First, Alice and
Bob publicly agree on a set of MK n-mode coherent states
|βn(x, s)〉 =
n⊗
j=1
|βj(x, s)〉 , (27)
for x = 1, . . . ,M and s = 1, . . . ,K . These coherent states
are defined by sampling the amplitudes βj(x, s) i.i.d. from
a circularly symmetric Gaussian distribution with zero mean
and variance ηN . For any given s, we consider the sliced
operator
Σ(s) =
M∑
x=1
P
n
B |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB , (28)
where PnB is the projector on the strongly δ-typical subspace
defined by ρ⊗nB (see, e.g. [33]). Applying the operator Cher-
noff bound (see Appendix for details) we obtain that the
bounds
(1− ǫ)M2−ng(ηN)PnB ≤ Σ(s) ≤ (1 + ǫ)M2−ng(ηN)PnB
(29)
hold true with arbitrarily high probability provided M ≫
2ng(ηN). It follows that for any given s the operators
Γx(s) =
P
n
B |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB
(1 + ǫ)M2−ng(ηN)
(30)
define a subnormalized POVM in Bob’s typical subspace,
which can be completed by introducing the operator Γ0(s) =
P
n
B −
∑
x Γx(s). In this way we have defined Bob’s mea-
surement Γ(s) for all values of s. After performing the mea-
surement, Bob declares an error if he obtains the measurement
output corresponding to Γ0(s). This event, however, happens
with a negligible probability (see Appendix for details).
In the third phase of the protocol, Alice makes a mea-
surement on her share of bosonic modes. For a given value
of s (which is known to Alice and Bob) and x, we con-
sider Alice’s conditional state ρnA(x, s). As a matter of fact,
Bob’s measurement induces a virtual backward communica-
tion channel from Bob to Alice. As a result, for given s, Al-
ice obtains an ensemble of states {ρnA(x, s), p(x, s)}x=1,...,M ,
where p(x, s) = Tr(Γx(s)ρnB(s)). The maximum amount of
classical information (per mode) about x that Alice can ex-
tract from this ensemble of states is given, in the asymptotic
setting, by the associated Holevo information [34] [35]:
χrr =
1
n
[
S(ρnA)−
∑
x
p(x, s)S(ρnA(x, s))
]
, (31)
6FIG. 5: The lossy bosonic channel can be modeled as a beam-splitter
with transmissivity η and the environment mode initially in the vac-
uum state. In the first phase of the reverse reconciliation protocol,
Alice sends one mode of a two-mode entangled state (denoted by the
symbol ‘∞’) down the channel.
where S(ρ) = −Tr (ρ log ρ) denotes the von Neumann en-
tropy. From the explicit expressions for p(x, s), ρnA(x, s) and
ρnA (given in the Appendix) we obtain
χrr = g(N)− g[(1− η)N ′] (32)
where N ′ = N/(1 + ηN). χrr also quantifies the rate (in
bits per mode) of shared randomness that can be established,
with the assistance of public communication, by Alice and
Bob [36].
Finally, to show the security of the communication proto-
col, we need to bound Eve’s accessible information about x.
Bob’s measurement also induces a virtual quantum channel
to Eve. For any given s, the ensemble of states obtained by
Eve is {ρnE(x, s), p(x, s)}x=1,...,M , where ρnE(x, s) is Eve’s
state conditioned on Bob’s measurement result x. Given the
explicit form of ρnE(x, s) we show (see Sec. VIII and the Ap-
pendix) that Eve’s accessible information about x is negligibly
small for K such that
krr := lim
n
logK
n
(33)
= 2g[(1− η)N ]− g[(1− η)N ′]− g[(1− η)N ′′] , (34)
with N ′′ = N(1 + 2ηN)/(1 + ηN). In conclusion, applying
the bootstrapping routine, we obtain a net rate of locked-key
generation of (in bits per mode)
rrr = χrr−krr = g(N)−2g[(1−η)N ]+g[(1−η)N ′′] , (35)
which in the limit of N →∞ reads
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1− η
)
. (36)
Similar results are obtained if the channel from Alice to
Bob is lossy and noisy. In this case the reverse reconciliation
protocol achieves an asymptotic locked-key rate of
rrr = 1 + log
(
1
1− η
)
− g(NT ) , (37)
where NT is the mean number of thermal photons per mode
in the channel.
VIII. SECURITY PROOFS
We discuss in details the case of the lossy channel. The
proof for the lossy and noisy channel can be obtained in a
similar way.
The starting point of the proof are some mathematical
tools presented in [17]. There we assumed that Eve’s states
ρnE(x, s) belongs to a finite-dimensional space of dimension
dn. Given the bipartite state
ρnXE =
1
M
M∑
x=1
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1
K
K∑
s=1
ρnE(x, s) , (38)
the following bound hold for the associated accessible infor-
mation (see [17]):
Iacc ≤ logM − d
n
M
min
|φ〉
{
H [Q(φ)]− η
[
M∑
x=1
Qx(φ)
]}
,
(39)
where
Qx(φ) =
1
K
K∑
s=1
〈φ|ρnE(x, s)|φ〉 , (40)
H [Q(φ)] =
∑M
x=1 η(Qx(φ)), with η( · ) = −( · ) log ( · ).
The minimum is over all vectors φ in Eve’s dn-dimensional
Hilbert space.
As shown in [17], if the ensemble of states from which the
codewords are sampled is such that for any unit vector |φ〉,
µ := Es[〈φ|ρnE(x, s)|φ〉] =
1
dn
(41)
(Es denotes the expectation value over s), and
Σ := Es[〈φ|ρnE(x, s)|φ〉2]
= Es[〈φ, φ|ρnE(x, s)⊗ ρnE(x, s)|φ, φ〉] , (42)
(here |φ, φ〉 ≡ |φ〉 ⊗ |φ〉) then the right hand side of (39) is
smaller than ǫ logM provided that
K > max
{
2γn
(
1
ǫ2
lnM +
2
ǫ3
ln
5
ǫ
)
,
dn
M
4 ln 2 ln dn
ǫ2
}
,
(43)
with
γn =
Σ
µ2
. (44)
In our setting n counts the number of modes employed in
one quantum data locking routine. Putting M = 2nχ and
ǫ = e−n
c
with c ∈ (0, 1), condition (43) yields an asymptotic
rate of secret-key consumption (in bits per mode)
k = lim
n→∞
1
n
logK = max {log γ, log d− χ} . (45)
In our continuous-variable setting, Eve’s space is infinite-
dimensional. Therefore, to apply the result of [17] we need to
7map Eve’s space into a finite dimensional one. In both the di-
rect and reverse reconciliation protocol, the expectation value
over s of the state of Eve has the form (see details in the Ap-
pendix)
ρnE = Es[ρ
n
E(x, s)] = ρ
⊗n
E , (46)
that is, the average state is a direct product. In particular, ρE is
a Gaussian state with zero mean, variance VE , and mean pho-
ton number (1 − η)N . We can hence consider the δ-typical
subspace projector Pnρ associated with ρ⊗nE . We use this pro-jector to define an auxiliary bipartite state of the form
σnXE =
1
M
M∑
x=1
|x〉〈x| ⊗ 1
K
K∑
s=1
σnE(x, s) , (47)
where
σnE(x, s) = P
n
ρ ρ
n
E(x, s)P
n
ρ (48)
is obtained by slicing with the δ-typical subspace projector.
From the properties of the typical projector we have
‖σnXE − ρnXE‖1 ≤ δ . (49)
Since the two states are δ-close in trace-norm, the security
of the state ρnXE follows, up to a probability δ, from that of
σnXE . In such a way we have reduced the problem to a finite
dimensional one, where the dimension is that of the δ-typical
subspace, i.e.,
dn := Tr
(
P
n
ρ
) ∈ [2n[S(ρE)−cδ], 2n[S(ρE)+cδ]] (50)
(for some constant c).
We use a notion of typical subspace that is a slightly dif-
ferent from the one usually considered (see for instance [33]).
Given a hermitian operator ξ we consider its spectral decom-
position
ξ =
∑
ℓ
pℓ Pℓ , (51)
where the sum is over the eigenvalues pℓ and the correspond-
ing eigenprojectors Pℓ, in such a way that pℓ 6= pℓ′ for ℓ 6= ℓ′
(that is, Tr (Pℓ) equals the degeneracy of pℓ). We look at each
projector Pℓ as an event whose probability is πℓ = pℓTr (Pℓ).
Given ξ⊗n, we then define the δ-typical projector Pnξ as (we
omit the subscript δ to simplify the notation)
P
n
ξ =
∑
pℓ1pℓ2 ···pℓn∈T
n
δ
Pℓ1 ⊗ Pℓ2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ Pℓn (52)
where the sum is over the sequences pℓ1pℓ2 · · · pℓn which are
δ-typical with respect to the probability distribution πℓ. No-
tice that this construction of the typical projector coincides
with the usual one when all the eigenvalues of ξ are non de-
generate.
First we compute (41):
µ = Es[〈φ|σnE(x, s) |φ〉] (53)
= Es[〈φ|Pnρ ρnE(x, s)Pnρ |φ〉] (54)
= 〈φ|Pnρ ρ⊗nE Pnρ |φ〉 . (55)
Then, from the equipartition properties of the δ-typical sub-
space we have (for some constant c)
2−n[S(ρE)+cδ] ≤ µ ≤ 2−n[S(ρE)−cδ] . (56)
To compute (42) we need to introduce another typical sub-
space projector. We consider the state (ρE ⊗ ρE)⊗n and its
associated (2δ)-typical subspace projector, denoted as Pnρ⊗ρ.
Notice that [Pnρ ⊗ Pnρ ,Pnρ⊗ρ] = 0, and that Pnρ ⊗ Pnρ ≤ Pnρ⊗ρ.
We also consider the state
ρn2E := Es[ρ
n
E(x, s)⊗ ρnE(x, s)] = ρ⊗n2E . (57)
By explicit computation (see Appendix) we can show that,
in both the direct and reverse reconciliation protocols, ρ2E is
a Gaussian state with zero mean and covariance matrix V2E .
Moreover, ρ2E commutes with ρE ⊗ ρE since they are both
diagonal in the photon-number basis (see Appendix). It fol-
lows that ρ2E also commutes with Pnρ⊗ρ. We also have that,
given that ρE has mean photon number (1 − η)N , then both
ρ2E and ρE ⊗ ρE have 2(1− η)N mean photons.
We can now compute (42):
Σ = Es[〈φ, φ|σnE(x, s)⊗ σnE(x, s) |φ, φ〉] (58)
= Es[〈φ, φ|Pnρ⊗2 ρnE(x, s)⊗ ρnE(x, s)Pnρ⊗2 |φ, φ〉] (59)
= 〈φ, φ|Pnρ⊗2 ρ⊗n2E Pnρ⊗2 |φ, φ〉 . (60)
Since Pnρ⊗2 commutes with Pnρ⊗ρ and Pnρ⊗2 ≤ Pnρ⊗ρ, we have
Σ ≤ 〈φ, φ|Pnρ⊗ρ ρ⊗n2E Pnρ⊗ρ |φ, φ〉 . (61)
To conclude, let us consider the sliced operator
P
n
ρ⊗ρ ρ
⊗n
2E P
n
ρ⊗ρ. Since [Pnρ⊗ρ, ρ⊗n2E ] = 0 we can apply a
classical argument concerning typical type classes (see, e.g.,
[37]). Let us denote as qℓ the eigenvalues of ρ2E . We notice
that the eigenvectors of Pnρ⊗ρ ρ⊗n2E Pnρ⊗ρ are those of ρ
⊗n
2E
which are in the range of Pnρ⊗ρ (that is, they are δ-typical for
(ρE ⊗ ρE)⊗n). Consider then an eigenvector whose δ-typical
type is π˜, the corresponding eigenvalue of Pnρ⊗ρ ρ⊗n2E Pnρ⊗ρ is
w =
∏
ℓ
qnπ˜ℓℓ = 2
n
∑
ℓ π˜ℓ log qℓ . (62)
Being ρ2E a zero-mean, thermal-like, Gaussian state, qℓ =
Z−12−βℓ, where ℓ is the photon number. This yields
w = 2−n(β〈ℓ〉π˜+logZ) (63)
= 2−n(β2(1−η)N+logZ+β∆〈ℓ〉) (64)
= 2−n(S(ρ2E)+β∆〈ℓ〉) . (65)
Here 〈ℓ〉π˜ =
∑
ℓ π˜ℓℓ is the mean photon number given by the
δ-typical distribution π˜. Since π˜ is δ-typical for (ρE⊗ρE)⊗n,
we expect 〈ℓ〉π˜ = 2(1 − η)N , ∆〈ℓ〉 = 〈ℓ〉π˜ − 2(1 − η)N
being the fluctuation about the expectation value. Finally we
have used S(ρ2E) = β2(1 − η)N + logZ . In the Appendix
we show that, for a δ-typical type π˜,
|β∆〈ℓ〉| ≤ 2cδ[(1− η)N + 1] (66)
8(for some constant c), from which we obtain
w ≤ 2−n(S(ρ2E)+2cδ[(1−η)N+1]) , (67)
and hence
Σ ≤ 2−n(S(ρ2E)+2cδ[(1−η)N+1]) . (68)
From these results, in the limits that n → ∞ and δ → 0,
we obtain the following bound on the key consumption rate:
k = max {2S(ρE)− S(ρ2E), S(ρE)− χ} . (69)
For the direct reconciliation protocol we have (see deriva-
tion in Appendix): χ = g(ηN), S(ρE) = g((1 − η)N), and
S(ρ2E) = g(2(1 − η)N). For any given η > 0 and N large
enough we then obtain
k = 2S(ρE)−S(ρ2E) = 2g[(1−η)N ]−g[2(1−η)N ] . (70)
For the reverse reconciliation protocol we have (see Ap-
pendix) χ = g(N)− g((1− η)N ′), with N ′ = N/(1 + ηN),
S(ρE) = g((1−η)N), and S(ρ2E) = g((1−η)N ′)+g((1−
η)N ′′), with N ′′ = N(1 + 2ηN)/(1 + ηN). For any given
η > 0 and N large enough we then obtain
k = 2S(ρE)− S(ρ2E) (71)
= 2g[(1− η)N ]− g[(1− η)N ′]− g[(1− η)N ′′] . (72)
IX. CONCLUSION
Quantum cryptography promises unconditionally secure
communication through insecure communication channels.
However, fundamental properties of quantum entanglement
bound the ultimate secret-key generation rates that can be
achieved through a communication channel [2]. For the rele-
vant case of a lossy communication line, as e.g. free-space of
fiber optics communication, the bound of [2] implies that the
secret-key generation rate must decrease at least exponentially
with increasing communication distance.
Here we have analyzed the rate-distance tradeoff under the
realistic assumption that one can store quantum information
reliably only for a finite time. Clearly, any quantum mem-
ory device can store quantum information only for a time of
the order of its coherence time. We have shown that for any
given finite, yet arbitrarily long, storage time, the quantum
data locking effect can be applied to generate key at a constant
rate over arbitrarily long distances through an optical channel
with linear loss. Moreover, we have shown that this result
holds also in the presence of moderate noise or experimental
imperfections modeled as a thermal background.
It remains an open problem to show that these high rates
of key generation can be achieved in practice. One major
problem is to find a decoding measurement that can be exper-
imentally realized with current technologies and still allows
us to achieve a constant key rate over long communication
distances. If this question will find a positive answer, our re-
sults could pave the way to a new family of QKD protocols
that yield a constant key rate that does not decay with increas-
ing communication distance. This would also imply that long
distance quantum communication can be in principle realized
without employing quantum repeaters.
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Appendix A: The direct reconciliation protocol
In the direct reconciliation protocol, the n-mode codewords
obtained by Eve read
ρnE(x, s) = |
√
1− η αn(x, s)〉〈
√
1− η αn(x, s)| , (A1)
where |√1− η αn(x, s)〉 = ⊗nj=1|
√
1− η αj(x, s)〉 is a n-
mode coherent state, where the amplitudesαj(x, s)’s are sam-
pled i.i.d. from a circularly symmetric Gaussian distribution
G(0,N) =
1
2πN e
−|α|2/N with zero mean and variance N .
Therefore the expectation value over s of ρnE(x, s) reads
Es[ρ
n
E(x, s)] =
(∫
dµ|
√
1− η α〉〈
√
1− η α|
)⊗n
(A2)
= ρ⊗nE , (A3)
where dµ = d2αG(0,N)(α), and ρE is a single-mode ther-
mal state with mean photon number (1 − η)N . The spectral
decomposition of ρE is
ρE =
1
(1− η)N + 1
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
(1 − η)N
(1− η)N + 1
)ℓ
|ℓ〉〈ℓ| , (A4)
where |ℓ〉 is the ℓ-photon state. The von Neumann entropy of
ρE is
S(ρE) = g((1− η)N) . (A5)
Therefore, denoting as Pnρ the δ-typical projector associated
with ρnE we have (for some constant c) (see e.g. [33])
2n[g((1−η)N)−cδ] ≤ Tr(Pnρ ) ≤ 2n[g((1−η)N)+cδ] (A6)
and
2−n[g((1−η)N)+cδ]Pnρ ≤ Pnρ ρnE Pnρ ≤ 2−n[g((1−η)N)−cδ]Pnρ .
(A7)
Consider the operator ρ⊗2E . This is a two-mode thermal
state with 2(1 − η)N mean photons. Its spectral decompo-
sition can be obtained from (A4):
ρ⊗2E =
(
1
(1 − η)N + 1
)2 ∞∑
ℓ=0
(
(1 − η)N
(1− η)N + 1
)ℓ
Pℓ ,
(A8)
where Pℓ denotes the projector on the subspace with ℓ pho-
tons. The ℓ-photon subspace is generated by the ℓ + 1
9two-mode vectors {|0〉|ℓ〉, |1〉|ℓ − 1〉, . . . |ℓ〉|0〉}, therefore
Tr (Pℓ) = ℓ+ 1.
Let us now consider the expectation value over s of the op-
erator ρnE(x, s) ⊗ ρnE(x, s):
Es[ρ
n
E(x, s)⊗ ρnE(x, s)] =(∫
dµ|
√
1− ηα〉〈
√
1− ηα| ⊗ |
√
1− ηα〉〈
√
1− ηα|
)⊗n
(A9)
= ρ⊗n2E . (A10)
The state ρ2E is a Gaussian state with zero mean and 2(1 −
η)N mean photons. Its spectral decomposition is:
ρ2E =
1
2(1− η)N + 1
∞∑
ℓ=0
(
2(1− η)N
2(1− η)N + 1
)ℓ
|ψ+ℓ 〉〈ψ+ℓ | ,
(A11)
where
|ψ+ℓ 〉 = 2−ℓ/2
ℓ∑
i=0
√(
ℓ
i
)
|i〉|ℓ− i〉 . (A12)
From this we compute the von Neumann entropy of ρ2E :
S(ρ2E) = g(2(1− η)N) . (A13)
Finally, since |ψℓ〉 is a ℓ-photon state, we obtain that ρ2E com-
mutes with ρE⊗ρE , which also implies that [ρ⊗n2E ,Pnρ⊗ρ] = 0.
Appendix B: The reverse reconciliation protocol
1. Bob’s measurement
We recall the statement of the operator Chernoff bound
[38]. Let {ξt}t=1,...,T be a collection of i.i.d. operator-valued
random variables, where each ξt is a positive hermitian oper-
ator in a Hilbert space of dimension D, satisfying ξt ≤ I and
with mean value E[ξt] = µ ≥ aI for some a ∈ (0, 1). Then
for any ǫ > 0 (and provided that (1 + ǫ)µ < 1) we have
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
ξt ≥ (1 + ǫ)µ
}
≤ D exp
(
−T ǫ
2a
4 ln 2
)
, (B1)
and
Pr
{
1
T
T∑
t=1
ξt ≤ (1− ǫ)µ
}
≤ D exp
(
−T ǫ
2a
4 ln 2
)
, (B2)
To define Bob’s POVM we apply this bound to the opera-
tors
ξ(x, s) = PnB |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB , (B3)
where PnB is the projector on Bob’s typical subspace. For any
given s, we have a collection {ξ(x, s)}x=1,...,M of M i.i.d.
operator-valued random variables, with ξ(x, s) ≤ PnB , and
E[ξ(x, s)] ≥ 2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]PnB . Hence by restricting to Bob’s
typical subspace, we meet the conditions for applying the op-
erator Chernoff bound with a = 2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]. It follows
from (B1) that for any s, the operator
Σ(s) =
M∑
x=1
P
n
B |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB (B4)
satisfies Σ(s) ≤ M(1 + ǫ)2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]PnB with arbitrary
high probability if M ≫ 2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]. This in turn implies
that the operators
Γx(s) =
P
n
B |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB
(1 + ǫ)M2−n[g(ηN)+cδ]
(B5)
define a subnormalized POVM, that is,
∑
x Γx(s) ≤ I (here
the identity is intended as the identity operator in the typical
subspace).
To complete the subnormalized POVM we introduce the
operator
Γ0(s) = I−
∑
x
Γ0(s) . (B6)
However, that the probability associated to the POVM element
Γ0(s) is negligibly small. Applying (B2) we obtain that
∑
x
Γx(s) ≥ 1− ǫ
1 + ǫ
≃ 1− ǫ2 , (B7)
from which it follows Γ0(s) . ǫ2.
2. Alice’s and Eve’s conditional states
For the reverse reconciliation protocol it is easier to work
in the Wigner function representation.
In the first phase of the reverse reconciliation protocol the
tripartite state ρnABE = ρ
⊗n
ABE is broadcast by Alice through
the quantum channel. ρ⊗nABE is the tensor product of n three-
mode zero-mean Guassian states (for a review on Gaussian
states see, e.g., [39]). The Wigner function of ρABE reads
W (RABE) = N exp
(
−1
2
RABEV
−1
ABER
T
ABE
)
, (B8)
where RABE = (qA, pA, qB, pB, qE , pE) is the three-mode
quadrature vector. The covariance matrix can be easily com-
puted and reads:
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VABE =
1
2


C 0 S
√
η 0 S
√
1− η 0
0 C 0 −S√η 0 −S√1− η
S
√
η 0 Cη + (1− η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1− η) 0
0 −S√η 0 Cη + (1− η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η)
S
√
1− η 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + η 0
0 −S√1− η 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + η


(B9)
where C = 2N + 1 and S = 2
√
N(N + 1). From VABE we obtain the covariance matrix of the joint state of Alice and Bob,
VAB =
1
2


C 0 S
√
η 0
0 C 0 −S√η
S
√
η 0 Cη + (1− η) 0
0 −S√η 0 Cη + (1− η)

 (B10)
and that of Eve and Bob,
VBE =
1
2


Cη + (1− η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0
0 Cη + (1 − η) 0 (C − 1)√η(1− η)
(C − 1)√η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + η 0
0 (C − 1)√η(1− η) 0 C(1− η) + η

 . (B11)
In the second phase of the protocol Bob makes a measure-
ment described by the POVM elements Γx(s) (30). To sim-
plify the notation we drop the normalization factor and write
Γx(s) ≃ PnB |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB . (B12)
We compute Alice’s (not-normalized) conditional state:
ρnA(x, s) = TrB[I
n
A ⊗ Λ(s)x ρ⊗nAB] (B13)
= TrB
[
I
n
A ⊗ PnB |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB ρ⊗nAB
]
.
(B14)
We apply the property of strong typicality,
‖PnB |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|PnB − |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)|‖1 ≤ δ,
to obtain, up to an error smaller than δ in trace distance,
ρnA(x, s) ≃ TrB
[
I
n
A ⊗ |βn(x, s)〉〈βn(x, s)| ρ⊗nAB
] (B15)
=
n⊗
j=1
TrB [IA ⊗ |βj(x, s)〉〈βj(x, s)| ρAB ] (B16)
=
n⊗
j=1
ρAj (x, s) . (B17)
Then the probability of the outcome ‘x’ can be obtained as
p(x, s) = Tr [ρnA(x, s)].
In the Wigner function representation, the equation
ρAj (x, s) = TrB [IA ⊗ |βj(x, s)〉〈βj(x, s)| ρAB ] reads
WAj(x,s)(RA) = (2π)
n
∫
d2nRBWβj(x,s)(RB)WAB(RAB) ,
(B18)
where WAB(RAB) is the Wigner function of ρAB and
Wβj(x,s)(RB) is the Wigner function of the coherent state
|βj(x, s)〉. With a lengthly but straightforward calculation we
found that the Wigner function of ρAj (x, s) is also Gaussian
with covariance matrix
VAj(x,s) =
[
(1− η)N
1 + ηN
+
1
2
](
1 0
0 1
)
. (B19)
From VAj(x,s) we can compute the von Neumann entropy
of the conditional states ρAj (x, s), which is S(ρAj (x, s)) =
g[(1− η)N ′] with N ′ = N/(1 + ηN).
By applying the same reasoning we compute the covariance
matrix of Eve’s conditional states ρEj (x, s):
VEj(x,s) =
[
(1− η)N
1 + ηN
+
1
2
](
1 0
0 1
)
. (B20)
We also compute the mean R¯j = (q¯Ej , p¯Ej) and obtain
q¯Ej(x,s) =
N
√
η(1− η)
1 + ηN
Re[βj(x, s)]√
2
(B21)
p¯Ej(x,s) =
N
√
η(1− η)
1 + ηN
Im[βj(x, s)]√
2
. (B22)
Notice that the mean is also a function of the mode label j
through the amplitude βj(x, s). We remark that Alice’s and
Eve’s conditional states have the same covariance matrix but
different mean.
3. Calculations for the security proof
From the form of the conditional state ρnE(x, s) =⊗n
j=1 ρ
n
Ej
(x, s) we can compute
Es[ρ
n
E(x, s)] = ρ
⊗n
E (B23)
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(notice that, for how Bob’s measurement has been defined, the
expectation value over s equals the expectation value over x).
ρE is a Gaussian state with zero mean. Its covariance matrix
can be obtained directly from (B11) and reads
VE =
1
2
(
C(1− η) + η 0
0 C(1 − η) + η
)
(B24)
=
[
(1 − η)N + 1
2
](
1 0
0 1
)
. (B25)
That is, ρE is a thermal state with (1 − η)N mean photons,
whose entropy is S(ρ(1−η)N ) = g[(1− η)N ]. We then obtain
2−n[g[(1−η)N ]+δ] Pnρ ≤ Pnρ ρ⊗nE Pnρ ≤ 2−n[g[(1−η)N ]−δ] Pnρ .
(B26)
The spectral decomposition of ρE is as in Eq. (A4). Similarly,
the operator ρE ⊗ ρE is identical to its homologous analyzed
for the direct reconciliation protocol, with spectral decompo-
sition given in Eq. (A8).
We now consider the operator ρ2E = Es[ρEj (x, s) ⊗
ρEj (x, s)]. Using the results of Sec. B 2 we found that ρ2E
is a Gaussian state with zero mean and covariance matrix
V2E =


(1 − η)N + 12 0 η(1− η)NN ′ 0
0 (1− η)N + 12 0 η(1 − η)NN ′
η(1− η)NN ′ 0 (1− η)N + 12 0
0 η(1− η)NN ′ 0 (1− η)N + 12

 , (B27)
with N ′ = N/(1+ ηN). From the covariance matrix V2E we
compute the von Neumann entropy S(ρ2E) = g[(1−η)N ′]+
g[(1 − η)N ′′], with N ′′ = N(1 + 2ηN)/(1 + ηN). Finally,
its spectral decomposition is
ρ2E =
1
(1− η)2N ′N ′′
∞∑
t,m=0
(
(1 − η)N ′
(1− η)N ′ + 1
)t
×
(
(1− η)N ′′
(1− η)N ′′ + 1
)m
|ψt,m〉〈ψt,m| , (B28)
with
|ψt,m〉 = 2−t−m2
t∑
j=0
m∑
k=0
(
t
j
)(
m
k
)
(−1)k
√
(t+m− j − k)!
×
√
(j + k)! |t+m− j − k〉|j + k〉 . (B29)
Notice that |ψt,m〉 is a state with exactly ℓ = t +m photons.
It follows that ρ2E commutes with ρE ⊗ ρE (see Eq. (A8)).
4. Active attack
An active Gaussian attack from the eavesdropper can be
modeled as a beam-splitter that mixes the mode from Alice
with a mode from a two-mode entangled state. As shown in
Fig. 6, the eavesdropper Eve obtains both the modes of the
two-mode entangled state. In this setting, if Alice’s two-mode
entangled state hasN mean photons per mode, and Eve’s two-
mode entangled state has NT mean photons per mode, then
the joint four-mode Gaussian state of Alice, Bob and Eve has
covariance matrix:
VABEE′ =
1
2


C 0 S
√
η 0 S
√
1− η 0 0 0
0 C 0 −S
√
η 0 −S
√
1− η 0 0
S
√
η 0 CT (1 − η) + Cη 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 −ST
√
1− η 0
0 −S
√
η 0 CT (1− η) + Cη 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 ST
√
1− η
S
√
1− η 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 C(1 − η) + CT η 0 ST η 0
0 −S
√
1− η 0 (C − CT )
√
η(1 − η) 0 C(1− η) + CT η 0 −ST η
0 0 −ST
√
1− η 0 ST η 0 CT 0
0 0 0 ST
√
1− η 0 −ST
√
η 0 CT


,
(B30)
where C = 2N+1, S = 2
√
N(N + 1), and CT = 2NT +1,
ST = 2
√
NT (NT + 1). We can use this covariance matrix
instead of (B9) and repeat the calculations done in subsections
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FIG. 6: A scheme for an active Gaussian attack. The beam splitter
mixes Alice’s mode with one mode from an entangled pair (denoted
by the symbol ‘∞’). The eavesdropper Eve obtains both the modes
of the two-mode state.
B 1-B 3 for the reverse reconciliation protocol. We obtain
χrr = g(N)− g[(1− η)N˜ ] , (B31)
with N˜ = N(1 + NT )/[1 + NT − (N − NT )η], and, for
N ≫ 1, NT ,
krr = g(NT ) + 2g[(1− η)N + ηNT ]− g[(1− η)N˜ ]− g[Nˆ ] ,
(B32)
with Nˆ = 2(1−η)N+ (1−η)+NT (2η2−1)η . Finally, in the limit
N →∞ we obtain
rrr = χrr − krr = 1 + log
(
1
1− η
)
− g(NT ) . (B33)
Appendix C: Fluctuations of the mean photon number ∆〈ℓ〉
Let us consider the distribution π, with
πℓ =
1
(1− η)N + 1
(
(1− η)N
(1− η)N + 1
)ℓ
(ℓ+ 1) , (C1)
and a δ-typical type π˜. The empirical entropy given by π˜ is
S = −
∞∑
ℓ=0
π˜ℓ log πℓ . (C2)
For δ-typical type we have small fluctuation of S around its
average, that is,
∆S = −
∞∑
ℓ=0
π˜ℓ log πℓ +
∞∑
ℓ=0
πℓ log πℓ ∈ [−cδ, cδ] . (C3)
From (C1) we obtain
S = log [(1− η)N + 1]
− log
(
(1− η)N
(1− η)N + 1
)
〈ℓ〉π˜ − 〈log (ℓ+ 1)〉π˜ , (C4)
which yields
∆S = − log
(
(1− η)N
(1 − η)N + 1
)
∆〈ℓ〉 −∆〈log (ℓ + 1)〉 .
(C5)
For N large enough we have
∆S ≃ log e
[
∆〈ℓ〉
(1 − η)N −
∆〈ℓ〉
(1 − η)N + 1
]
, (C6)
where we have used the fact that 〈ℓ〉π˜ fluctuates about (1 −
η)N . Finally we obtain
log e∆〈ℓ〉
(1 − η)N ≃ [(1− η)N + 1]∆S . (C7)
Since for N large enough β = log e(1−η)N , we have
β∆〈ℓ〉 ≃ [(1− η)N + 1]∆S . (C8)
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